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From a Tender Years Presumption to a Primary 
Parent Presumption: Has Anything Really 
Changed? ... Should It? 
Phyllis T. Bookspan* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The American family is under stress. About one in every 
four American children live with only one parent.1 Scholars 
and social pundets are currently re-emphasizing such topics as 
family configurations, divorce, and child custody. Single parent 
families are the subject of much negative commentary,2 and 
no-fault divorce laws appear to be suffering from severe 
backlash.3 The cover story of the April issue of The Atlantic 
Monthly is titled Dan Quayle Was Right.4 The author, Barbara 
Dafoe Whitehead, asserts that divorce weakens and 
undermines society by harming the children involved.5 She 
comprehensively details economic disadvantages and lasting 
social, psychological, and societal problems faced by large 
• Copyright 1993 by Phyllis T. Bookspan, Associate Professor of Law, 
Widener University School of Law; A.B. Herbert H. Lehman College, City 
University of New York, 1976; J.D. 1983, L.L.M. 1987, Georgetown University Law 
Center. I would like to thank Professor Lynn Wardle and the International Society 
of Family Law for hosting Family Restructuring at the End of the 20th Century, 
and for granting me an opportunity to present this paper. I also thank my fine 
research assistant, Julia Scott. 
1 Ronald Smothers, The Post Nuclear Family: Tell It to Mom, Dad and the 
Authorities, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1993, § 4, at 4. 
2 See, e.g., id.; CHRISTOPHER LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD: THE 
FAMILY BESIEGED (1977) (idealizing the patriarchal family and condemning 
"modern" family structure as alienated and isolated). 
3 Margaret F. Brinig & Stephen M. Crafton, Marriage and Opportunism 
(June 10-12, 1993) (paper presented at the International Society of Family Law 
Conference); Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 
1441, 1478 (stating that no-fault divorce presumptively ends not only the parties 
legal union, but also their financial responsibilities toward each other); LENORE J. 
WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION (1985). 
4 Barbara D. Whitehead, Dan Quayle Was Right, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 
1993, at 47. 
5 See id. (noting that children in divorced or single parent families do 
worse than children in intact families). 
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numbers of children from disrupted families. 6 Children of 
divorce often fare worse in school, are more likely to become 
delinquents, and frequently have problems throughout life. 7 
Ms. Whitehead makes a compelling argument that family 
relationships should be permanent and binding.8 Former 
Education Secretary William J. Bennett recently advocated 
rescinding no-fault divorce law for parents with children.9 
Harvard Professor Mary Ann Glendon says that once a couple 
has children, there is "something like a moral mortgage" on 
their property and income until all the children's needs are 
met. 10 In the shadow of these challenges to divorce, I will 
explore how we can best protect children when, unfortunately, 
families do restructure. 
Child custody decision making has plagued society since 
the days of King Solomon. 11 The topic is laden with social, 
6 See id. at 84 (noting that broken families have produced the first 
generation in history that will do worse psychologically, socially, and economically 
than its parents). 
7 See id. at 47 (noting that children in divorced or single-parent families 
are more likely to drop out of high school, get pregnant as teenagers and abuse 
drugs); see also id. (noting that childrens' difficulties associated with family 
breakup often persist into adulthood). 
8 ld. at 84. 
9 Charles Green, The Effects on Children Prompt a New Look at Divorce, 
PHILA. INQUIRER, May 4, 1993, at A1, A6. 
10 MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 94-95 
(1987). 
11 Two women came before King Solomon, each claiming to be the mother of 
the same baby. To decide the case, Solomon ordered that the child be cut in two, 
each mother to receive half. Solomon found that the woman who objected was the 
true mother and awarded her custody. 1 Kings 3:16-18. 
In Bertolt Brecht's The Caucasian Chalk Circle, the Governor's Wife left behind 
her child as she hurriedly abandoned her home, escaping a proletariat mob. 
Grusha, a palace kitchen maid, saved the baby and took care of him and raised 
him. When the Governor's wife returns and wants the child back Judge Azdak 
determines custody: 
FIRST LAWYER: High Court of Justice! Blood, as the popular saying 
goes, is thicker than water. This old adage .... 
AZDAK (interrupting): The Court wants to know the lawyers' fee. 
FIRST LAWYER (surprised): I beg your pardon? (Azdak, smiling, rubs his 
thumb and index finger.) Oh, I see. Five hundred piasters, Your Honor, to 
answer the Court's somewhat unusual question. 
AZDAK: Did you hear? The question is unusual. I ask it because I listen 
to you in quite a different way when I know you are good. 
FIRST LAWYER (bowing): Thank you, Your Honor, High Court of Justice, 
of all ties the ties of blood are strongest. Mother and child-is there a 
more intimate relationship? Can one tear a child from its mother? High 
Court of Justice, she has conceived it in the holy ecstasies of love. She 
has carried it in her womb. She has fed it with her blood. She has borne 
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political, and sexual overtones, and we have yet to find a 
widely accepted and fitting solution. This article will discuss 
why custody decisions should be private rather than public. It 
will then briefly trace the development of determinative 
custody decision making from the tender years presumption to 
a primary parent/caretaker presumption. Finally, I will argue 
that the primary caretaker presumption should be utilized 
when families resort to the adversarial arena. 
II. CHILD CUSTODY DECISIONS SHOULD BE PRIVATE 
When marriages dissolve, the fate of children of that union 
should not be decided in the adversarial arena. 12 Mothers and 
fathers usually come to court with angry agendas and unequal 
bargaining power. Meanwhile, the best interests of children 
languish with protracted, contested custody fights. 13 As in 
it with pain. High Court of Justice, it has been observed that even the 
wild tigress, robbed of her young, roams restless through the mountains, 
shrunk to a shadow. Nature herself ... 
AZDAK (interrupting, to Grusha): What's your answer to all this and 
anything else that lawyer might have to say? 
GRUSHA: He's mine. 
AZDAK: Is that all? I hope you can prove it. In any case, I advise you to 
tell me why you think I should assign the child to you. 
GRUSHA: I brought him up like the priest says "according to my best 
knowledge and conscience." I always found him something to eat. Most of 
the time he had a roof over his head. And I went to such trouble for 
him. I had expenses too. I didn't look out for my own comfort. I brought 
the child up to be friendly with everyone, and from the beginning taught 
him to work as well as he could. He's still a very little thing. 
BERTOLT BRECHT, THE CAUCASIAN CHALK CIRCLE 180-81 (Oxford Univ. Press 1947). 
To decide the case, Azdak creates a test. A chalk circle is drawn on the floor, the 
child is placed in the center, and the judge orders that "the true mother is she 
who has the strength to pull the child out of the circle toward herself." The 
Governor's wife complains that she is not as strong as Grusha, a working maid, 
and is at a disadvantage. Grusha doesn't pull. In despair Grusha exclaims, "I 
brought him up! Am I to tear him to pieces? I can't do it!" Azdak determines that 
Grusha is the true mother. ld. at 186-87. 
12 See, e.g., Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child 
Custody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE L. & PoL'v REV. 168, 174-75 (1984) 
(stating that court-determined custody under best interest of the child standard 
necessitates endless expert testimony, psychological probing of parents and children, 
and even intentional creation of painful situations by the "experts" in order to 
prove one or the other parent is more fit). 
13 ld. at 177-78. This is demonstrated by the hypothetical case of a father of 
two who, despite having no desire for custody, vowed to fight his wife every step 
of the way to gain custody of the children in a jurisdiction where he had virtually 
no chance of getting custody. The wife, however, was unwilling to accept even the 
slightest risk of losing her children, and agreed to accept minimal alimony and 
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other areas of the law, better and cheaper results can be 
attained if the parties are able to resolve their disputes without 
state intervention. 14 Parents, not judges or helping 
professionals, are best suited to decide the fate of their 
children. Empirical evidence suggests that many families are 
able to resolve their disputes without state intervention. 15 The 
challenge is to create incentives for all parents to keep custody 
decisions private. 16 
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DETERMINATIVE 
CUSTODY DECISIONMAKING 
A. Tender Years Presumption 
Historically custody decisions were determinative. English 
common law considered children to be paternal property and 
automatically granted custody to the father in the event of 
divorce. 17 This rule was reversed in The Custody of Infants 
Acts of 1839 and 1873. 18 The Acts established a matemal 
preference that awarded custody of young children to the moth-
er, unless she was morally impure or unfit. 19 This rule became 
known as the tender years presumption. For women and chil-
dren, the tender years presumption was a great ideological and 
child support to avoid a custody battle. See Mary Ann Mason, Motherhood v. Equal 
Treatment, 29 J. FAM. L. 1, 26-27 (1990). 
14 See generally ROGER FISHER & ROGER UHRY, GETTING TO YES STRATEGIES 
OF SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION (Bruce Patton ed., 1981); Marygold S. Melli et a!., 
The Process of Negotiation: An Exploratory Investigation in the Context of No-Fault 
Divorce, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 1133 (1988); Neely, supra note 12, at 184. 
15 See. e.g., ELEANOR MACCOBY ET AL., DIVIDING THE CHILD 98-104 (1992) 
(noting that out of 933 custody cases filed in Santa Clara and San Mateo Counties, 
only 14 needed to be adjudicated). In 1990 in West Virginia, 14,582 domestic 
relations cases were filed. Only 53 of those went to trial; 45 of those 53 were 
appealed. STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 1H (1992); see 
also Robert H. Mnookin, Divorce Bargaining: The Limits on Private Ordering, 18 
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1015, 1016 (1985). 
16 Eliminating uncertainty in custody determinations would serve to 
eliminate both the cost of litigation and the possibility that a custody fight could 
be threatened simply to gain a more favorable settlement. Most importantly, 
however, it would benefit the children. Parents who best know their children's 
needs and personalities would have to determine their children's living 
arrangements, not leave this critical decision to a judge-a neutral stranger. 
17 Andre P. Derdeyn, Child Custody Contests in Historical Perspective, 133 
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1369, 1370 (1978). 
18 An Act to Amend the Law Relating to the Custody of Infants, 1839, 2 & 
3 Viet., ch. 54 (Eng). 
19 Id. 
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practical victory.20 The presumption severed the notion that 
children were marital property,21 acknowledged that women 
could be heads of households, 22 and allowed women to leave 
bad marriages without losing their children.23 Nevertheless, 
the maternal tender years presumption also was a practical 
and ideological defeat. 24 It virtually guaranteed lower econom-
ic status for women and children.25 It also formalized the cult 
of domesticity-the notion that a woman's place is in the home 
caring for others. 26 
The maternal presumption was adopted by most American 
states and went essentially unchallenged for nearly a centu-
ry.27 However, with growing societal pressure for sexual 
equality and gender neutrality, the maternal preference suc-
cumbed to attacks by fathers' rights groups and some femi-
nists.28 At least two states found that the tender years pre-
sumption violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.29 Although it is unlikely the Supreme 
Court would rule similarly,30 most states have abandoned this 
"non-politically correct" preference.31 
20 Fran Olsen, The Politics of Family Law, 2 LAW & INEQ. J. 1, 13-14 
(1984). 
21 See generally 1 WILLIAM BLACKS'TONE, COMMENTARIES 435-38 (Layston 
Press 1966) (1765). 
22 Olsen, supra note 20, at 13. 
23 ld. at 14. 
24 Laura Sack, Women and Children First: A Feminist Analysis of the Pri-
mary Caretaker Standard in Child Custody Cases, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 291, 
296 (1992). 
25 See id. 
26 See id. 
27 Mason, supra note 13, at 20. 
28 But see Judith B. Jennison, The Search for Equality in a Woman's World: 
Fathers' Rights to Child Custody, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1141 (1991) (arguing that 
despite the technical elimination of the maternal preference rule, in practice it is 
still applied in most courts today). 
29 Mason, supra note 13, at 27 n.124. See State ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 350 
N.Y.S.2d 2Rfi (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1973); Ex parte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686 (Ala. 1981); 
see also King v. Vancil, 341 N.E.2d 65 (Ill. 197fi) (maternal preference rule violates 
state's Equal Protection Clause). 
30 See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (finding that it 
was not a violation of equal protection for California only to prosecute males under 
its statutory rape law). Since gender classifications are not subject to strict scruti-
ny and since men and women are necessarily not similarly situated with respect to 
childbirth and pregnancy, the maternal preference would likely not constitute an 
equal protection violation. Mason, supra note 13, at 8, 27. 
31 Jennison, supra note 28, at 1146. But see, Sheri A. Ahl, Note, Minnesota 
Developments, a Step Backward: The Minnesota Supreme Court Adopts a ''Primary 
Caretaker" Presumption in Child Custody Cases: Pikula v. Pikula, 70 MINN. L. REV. 
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B. The Best Interests Standard 
The best interests standard abolished custodial preference 
for the mother and focused instead upon the needs of the chil-
dren. Experts such as Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Al-
bert Solnit proposed that when parents could not resolve custo-
dy, courts should use a best interests of the child test to deter-
mine who best meets the child's needs.32 The problem with 
this standard is obvious. A judge, who knows virtually nothing 
about the emotionally traumatized family before her, cannot 
simply step in and decide what is best for the child.33 
To assist judges in their decisions, a battery of experts may 
be added to the custodial picture. 34 Room for error expands as 
judges, saddled with personal bias,35 are persuaded by child 
welfare professionals who also are not immune from prejudice 
or mistake. Psychologists hired to perform custody evaluations 
are ostensibly neutral and only should consider the child's best 
interests. Unfortunately, like other expert witnesses, they are 
subject to both their own preference and their clients' persua-
sions. Such experts can characterize a set of facts so that a 
particular conclusion follows. 36 
A case involving an evaluation performed by a licensed 
psychiatric social worker who specialized in custody evalua-
1344, 1350 n.25 (1986) (detailing decisions in which the Minnesota courts continued 
to apply the maternal preference rule despite a statute abolishing the preference 
and setting forth factors which must be considered in determining custody). 
32 JOSEPH GoLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
(1979). 
33 Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Barpaining in the Shadow of the 
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 952-58 (1979). 
34 Neely, supra note 12, at 173. As Justice Neely points out: 
[W]hen hiring an expert witness, parties generally want a person of the 
lowest possible integrity, one who will lie, or at least mislead, under oath. 
Expert witnesses are, after all, very much like lawyers: They are paid to 
take a set of facts from which different inferences may be drawn and to 
characterize those facts so that a particular conclusion follows. 
!d. Thus, even if the judge truly has the child's best interests at heart, the ex-
perts often do not, and will mold a family's situation to fit the needs of their cli-
ents, exposing the child to unnecessary harm. !d. 
35 Sack, supra note 24, at 310-11. This article describes the opinion of one 
West Virginia judge who awarded custody to the non-primary caretaker father 
because the mother shared her home with an unmarried man. !d. The judge went 
so far as to appear on national television, airing his view that the mother was 
morally unfit because she was sleeping with a man who was not her child's father. 
!d. 
36 Neely, supra note 12, at 173-74. 
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tions highlights the danger of biased psychological evidence.37 
This case involved an unmarried couple who were not living 
together when the child was born.38 When the child was eight 
months old, the mother moved in with the father and remained 
in his home for eleven months.39 Without notice, the mother 
left the father's home and took their son with her to a domestic 
abuse shelter in a neighboring state. She asserted that the 
father was emotionally abusive.40 The father petitioned for 
custody, and the court ordered a custody evaluation. 
The court-appointed social work expert recommended that 
legal and primary custody should be with the fatherY Among 
the various items in support of her conclusion, the evaluator 
wrote: "The relationship between J. and his father is far less 
dependent upon strict schedules and long day care."42 
Throughout the report, the evaluator repeatedly referred to the 
child's day care and expressed serious concern about the child 
(now two years old) being in day care from 7:30 a.m. to 5:00 
p.m.43 The report omits the fact that J. was in day care be-
37 This evaluation was performed upon order of the court in Delaware 
County, Pennsylvania. A student in the Widener University School of Law's Penn· 
sylvania Domestic Relations Clinic represented the mother in this dispute. The 
psychologist who authored this report is female. She works for an agency that 
routinely is hired by the court to perform psychological assessments in domestic 
relations cases. Since the case has not yet reached adjudication, no further identi-
fying information is appropriate at this time. The report will be referred to as 
"Custody Evaluation" and is on file with the author. 
38 Custody Evaluation, supra note 37, at 3. 
39 ld. 
40 Id. 
41 Although the parties in this case were not married, the expert's recom-
mendation is consistent with recent empirical evidence that documents among other 
things that: 1) fathers who are plaintiffs in divorce petitions are more likely to 
receive custody; and 2) if a court-ordered investigation occurs, fathers are more 
likely to receive physical custody. Greer L. Fox & Robert F. Kelly, Socioeconomic 
and Legal Determinants of Maternal and Paternal Physical Custody Arrangements 
at Divorce (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the B.Y.U. Journal of Pub-
lic Law). 
42 Custody Evaluation, supra note 37, at 19. 
43 There actually is some discrepancy in the c'Ustody evaluation about the 
actual hours the child is in day care; however, what is almost immediately appar-
ent is the evaluator's bias against day care. The evaluator scatters reference to day 
care throughout the report, including: 
[The mother] immediately applied for subsidized housing, day care, public 
assistance, food stamps, etc ..... She chose a day care center 20 min-
utes ride from the shelter ... J attends full day care from 7:30 to 5:00 
p.m .... It was not clear whether she [mother] was working full-time or 
part-time, although she indicated that J attends day care between 7-7:30 
a.m. and 5:00 p_m, daily .... J's day care teacher said that J is there 
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cause his mother was working to enable herself to earn enough 
money to move out of the shelter. Moreover, although the 
father worked, the evaluator expressed little concern over the 
day care situation if the father were given custody.44 The eval-
uator also expressed concern about a two year old with a fifty 
word vocabulary and "delayed toilet training."45 
The evaluator concluded that the father is: 
[A] man overly trusting and who tried to build a relationship 
even where there never had been one, offering his home ... 
to support [the mother] and boy. His only failing was that he 
allowed himself to be used, and was not self-protective enough 
and probably passive for too long. 
I believe that the Court needs to concern itself with a two 
year old boy being raised by a disturbed mother who has such 
deeply entrenched negative, mistrustful and paranoid posi-
tions towards men and who views them as dangerous and 
abusive. The question needs to be raised of the deleterious 
effect of a child being raised from birth with the notion that 
his father abused his mother, and forced her to leave him and 
move to a shelter .... 46 
The evaluator conducted no independent evaluation of the 
abuse allegations. Yet, without such objective facts, she con-
cluded that the mother made up the abuse claim and used it to 
obtain entry into a shelter where she could "take advantage of 
the system.'>47 
Contrary to the evaluator's conclusion that the mother's 
goal was to "reap the benefits" of shelter care, as soon as the 
mother found a better job she moved out of the shelter to a 
nice, two bedroom apartment. Her lawyer, herself a former 
child welfare specialist for twenty years, concluded that the 
daily from 8:00 a.m.-4:30 p.m .... Ms. [mother] is utilizing the shelter 
system, where she describes getting free day care ... She [mother] ap-
pears to have a strict schedule for a two year old who spends almost 10 
hours each day in day care ... The relationship between J and his fa-
ther is far less dependent upon ... long day care. 
ld. at 4-19. 
44 "Mr. has access to the same caretaker they had when he and Ms. lived 
together .... If he uses formal day care, he gets out of work at 3:Hi p.m.: thus 
J's days in day care would not have to be so long." ld. at 12. 
45 ld. Many, if not most, parents might he in "big trouble" if judged upon 
whether their two year old is toilet trained. See id. 
46 ld. 
47 ld. at 17. 
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mother "seems very nurturing and the child is happy, well-ad-
justed, and has a close relationship with his mother."48 How-
ever, even if the mother's lawyer is able to challenge the 
evaluator's biased and unsubstantiated report, the outcome re-
mains unpredictable. The court most likely will place undue 
weight on the professional judgment of the court appointed 
evaluator-an expert the court has trusted and relied upon in 
the past. Thus, while the best interests standard is a noble 
ideal, it can be a practical nightmare. 
C. Joint Custody Preference 
To avoid parental distinctions, many states adopted prefer-
ences for joint custody. While ideally children benefit from 
continued contact with both parents, judicially imposed joint 
custody (in all its various permutations) often is not a just 
solution. Statutorily mandated joint custody fails to recognize 
the irreconcilable differences in the marriage itself. Forcing a 
continuing relationship between ex-spouses can establish un-
workable relationships that cause more stress for parents and 
children.49 Joint custody also may create unnecessary dual 
responsibility for most decisions and can generate situations 
that are not in the children's best interests. 5° Finally, recent 
research suggests that joint legal custody fails to live up to its 
promise. "[l]t appears that joint legal custody is neither the 
solution to the problems of divorce nor a catalyst for increasing 
conflict in divorcing families."51 Families are not like loaves of 
bread-they cannot be sliced up and neatly shared. 
D. Primary Caretaker Presumption 
This brings us to the most recent reform-the primary 
parent or primary caretaker presumption. The presumption, 
initiated by the West Virginia Supreme Court in Garska v. 
McCoy,52 is a fact-based, ostensibly gender-neutral test.53 In 
48 Conversation between student attorney and the author. 
49 Andre P. Derdeyn & Elizabeth Scott, Joint Custody: A Critical Analysis 
and Appraisal, AM. J. 0RTHOPSYCHIAT., Apr. 1984, at 199. 
50 Jennison, supra note 28, at 1180-82. 
51 Catherine R. Albiston et al., Does Joint Legal Custody Matter?, 2 STAN. L. 
& POL'v REV. 167, 176 (1990). 
52 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981). 
53 Although as Justice Neely readily admits, the list of criteria used to de-
tennine the primary caretaker parent usually spells "mother." Neely, supra note 
12, at 180. 
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custody cases, the court favors the parent who has performed 
the bulk of nurturing/maintenance activities such as providing 
meals, bathing, grooming, taking the child for medical appoint-
ments, planning the child's social activities, etc.54 The rule ap-
plies only to children too young to express an opinion and, like 
the tender years presumption, may be rebutted upon a showing 
of unfitness.55 Although only two jurisdictions formally have 
adopted the rule,56 a 1982 study of appellate court decisions 
found the idea of a primary caretaker increasingly popular in 
determining custody disputes. Professor Jeff Atkinson found a 
preference for the primary caretaker second only to a stable 
environment in the initial determination of custody. 57 
Although the primary caretaker presumption is a nurtur-
ing based test, it has been harshly criticized as favoring wom-
en, and as a thinly disguised version of the tender years pre-
sumption rule. 58 Part of this criticism is true. Women general-
ly do fare better under this test. Even in dual career house-
holds, most mothers perform the majority of care-giving tasks 
and thus they are the primary parent.59 But this need not be 
the case since nurturing is not inherently a gender-based trait. 
(Recall the underlying premise of joint custody-that mothers 
and fathers are similarly capable of performing parental roles.) 
54 The Garska v. McCoy test includes the following ten factors: 
1) preparing and planning of meals; 2) bathing, grooming and dressing; 3) 
purchasing, cleaning, and care of clothes; 4) medical care, including nurs-
ing and trips to physicians; 5) arranging for social interaction among 
peers . . . ; 6) arranging alternative care, i.e. babysitting . . . ; 7) ... 
waking child in the morning; 8) disciplining, i.e. teaching general manners 
and toilet training; 9) educating, i.e. religious, c"Ultural, social, etc.; and 
10) teaching elementary skills, i.e. reading, writing and arithmetic. 
Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 273. 
55 Under West Virginia's scheme, children six and under are automatically 
subject to the primary caretaker rule. Children between six and 14, if they have a 
stated preference, are given greater flexibility. And a child over the age of 14 is 
usually permitted to make her own custody decision. See Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 
361-63. 
56 Minnesota followed West Virginia in Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705 
(Minn. 1985). In 1989, however, Minnesota's legislature adopted a statutory scheme 
which enumerated 12 factors, including the primary caretaker, to be determined in 
awarding custody. Thus, the primary caretaker presumption was eliminated as a 
formal preference in that state. MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (1990). 
57 Jeff Atkinson, Criteria for Deciding Child Custody in the Trial and Appel-
late Courts, 18 FAM. L.Q. 1, 9 (1984). 
58 Jennison, supra note 28, at 1153. 
59 See ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT (19R9) (finding that in only 
20% of dual-career families, men share housework equally with women). 
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Rather, nurturing is a choice that men and women make.60 To 
the extent the primary caretaker rule is attacked because it is 
based upon caretaking activity, nurturing is devalued as a 
decisional factor. Professor Martha Fineman goes even further 
and suggests that subordinating the facially gender-neutral 
primary caretaker test to further neutral factors is anti-mater-
nal and not gender-neutral in impact.61 
Conversely, critics also attack the primary caretaker pref-
erence because it creates a gender-free alternative to maternal 
preference.62 Professor Mary Ann Mason argues for a return 
to the maternal preference because men and women are nei-
ther similarly situated biologically, nor in terms of social reali-
ty.63 She says that while "fathers can, in the right circum-
stances, be turned into mothers, the social reality is that moth-
ers are already mothers . . . . It is surely in the best interests 
of children to recognize this social reality and guarantee the 
continuity of care which will be most protective of young chil-
dren."64 
IV. HAS ANYTHING REALLY CHANGED? 
This all brings us to the question of whether anything 
really has changed. Except for the advent of the tender years 
presumption, which radically altered custody and women's and 
children's rights, very little is different. Empirical studies con-
firm this. Mter an eight year longitudinal study of 1100 divorc-
ing families in Santa Clara and San Mateo Counties, Profes-
sors Catherine Albiston, Robert Mnookin and Eleanor Maccoby 
concluded that there is remarkable and widespread persistence 
of substantial gender role differentiation following divorce.65 
Women are still overwhelmingly the physical custodians, and 
even in joint custody arrangements, children live primarily 
with their mothers.66 
60 !d. 
61 Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal 
Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 77:3 (1988). 
62 Mason, supra note 1:3, at 2:3. 
6:3 !d. at 25. 
64 !d. 
65 Albiston et al., supra note 51, at 176. 
66 !d. at 170. Since California does not have a tender years presumption, 
and has not adopted the primary caretaker presumption, the present advantage 
that the nurturer standard gives to women had no identifiable impact on these 
results. 
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V. SHOULD ANYTHING CHANGE? 
In a restructuring family, children's interests must be 
paramount. States are not the best protectors of children-
families are. Thus, states should distance themeselves from 
the custody process and actively encourage private 
decisionmaking. If parents could effectively predict a court's 
custody decision from the outset of marital breakdown, there 
would be less incentive to resort to litigation.67 Further, the 
demand for state intervention would diminish if courts could 
impose penalties for failure to privately negotiate custody disp-
utes.68 
A. A Determinative Standard, Such as the Primary 
Caretaker Presumption, Should Be Broadly Adopted 
The public adversarial arena is not suitable for determin-
ing the fate of children. To reduce litigation, society needs a 
broader adoption of a determinative custody standard. Further, 
since the best interests standard may encourage rather than 
discourage litigation, we should rethink its suitability as a sole 
determinative measure. The primary caretaker presumption 
should be adopted because it has the potential to lessen litiga-
tion, and because it awards custody where, in most cases it 
should be .. This is in the family's best interest. 
A determinative standard for custody decisions is in the 
best interest of children because it removes the incentive for 
parents to threaten adjudication.69 A fixed standard encour-
67 See Margaret F. Brinig & Michael V. Alexeev, TradinJ? at Divorce: Prefer-
ences, Legal Rules and Transaction Costs, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 279 
(1993). The authors conducted an empirical study louking at economic bargaining 
principles and negotiations at the time of divorce in two differing jurisdictions. 
Their data suggest that in the jurisdiction where the outcome is determinate there 
is less litigation. The authors conclude that legal statutes and precedents do affect 
private negotiations. If an anticipated judicial outcome bears little relationship to 
what the parties really want, the threat of litigation is not credible, and the par-
ties are more likely to resolve their disputes themselves. !d. at 290-91. 
68 Chief Justice Neely of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals forc-
efully argues that parties to a custody dispute (usually fathers) may engage in the 
dispute to gain a financial advantage. Neely, supra note 12, at 177. If, in fact, 
allowing a dispute to proceed to adjudication results in a financial penalty, those 
cases otherwise destined to burden the courts and taxpayers, and to harm the 
children, might be resolved without state intervention. 
69 The unpredictability of outcome under the vague best interest standard 
only encourages litigation, causing further harm to the children in the process. 
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ages parents-who know their children best-to privately nego-
tiate child custody. The standard also saves children from the 
trauma of protracted psychological interviews, evaluations, and 
court proceedings. Finally, it protects them from becoming 
pawns in their parents' war. 
One determinative standard which serves the children's 
best interests is the primary caretaker preference. The primary 
caretaker preference merits greater attention than it presently 
receives in most states. Admittedly, this standard presently 
favors women, but, although we strive for sexual equality, it is 
not necessarily best for children. While judicially-imposed joint 
custody arrangements may meet the needs of the parents, they 
may provide the worst of both worlds for the child. 70 The par-
ent who has most accommodated to the demands of parenthood 
is the parent with whom the children have had the most physi-
cal contact. 71 Although not universal, children probably have 
the greater psychological bond with the primary nurturer.72 
When families cannot work out custody by themselves, the 
court should give preference to the primary caretaker. This will 
provide stability and continuity for the child. 
B. A Determinative Standard Can Encourage 
Private Negotiation 
Since continuity and contact with both parents is in the 
children's best interests, parents must be encouraged to ar-
range for their children's needs by themselves without judicial 
or other public intervention. 73 When forced to decide their 
children's fate without outside intercession, parents hopefully 
will put their children's needs before their own anger or hurt, 
and recognize their children's need for time with both parents. 
If a public outcome were essentially pre-determined, the threat 
of a custody battle would be toothless, and the unequal bar-
gaining power that often accompanies such custody battles is 
eliminated. The courtroom becomes a less attractive arena. 74 
Neely, supra note 12, at 174. 
70 Fineman, supra note 61, at 761. 
71 See GoLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 32, at 27 (discussing the importance of 
the psychological parent). 
72 hi. 
73 Albiston et al., supra note 51, at 168. 
74 See generally Neely, supra note 12, at 180. 
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Although a determinative primary caretaker standard is 
designed to encourage parents to resolve their disputes private-
ly, it might also create a presumption that may discourage 
negotiation by the primary caretaker. Ideally, the primary 
caretaker will recognize the children's interest in a continuing 
relationship with both parents and work to establish a mutu-
ally acceptable custodial arrangement. However, a primary 
caretaker who cannot, or does not, perceive any benefit from 
the children's contact with the other parent, may have little 
incentive to negotiate with the other parent. 
With sufficient inducement, however, even uncooperative 
primary parents can be encouraged to negotiate. The primary 
caretaker who is unable or unwilling to consider the children's 
best interests must be given some incentive to negotiate. One 
way to create such an incentive is to admit the failure to nego-
tiate as evidence in the divorce property settlement. Upon 
receipt of such evidence, the court may impose a financial pen-
alty on the non-negotiating spouse, so long as the children's 
financial well-being is not threatened. 75 The court must have 
discretion to determine when penalties for failure to negotiate 
should be assessed. If, for example, the primary parent alleges 
that contact with the non-primary parent may be harmful to 
the children, and the court makes a similar finding, no penal-
ties should be assessed. If the non-negotiating spouse is also 
the greater wage-earner, then other incentives should be per-
mitted, such as ordering him/her to forfeit a dependent child 
tax exemption. With both the opportunity to predict the results 
of custody case litigation and sufficient financial disincentives 
to state intervention, divorcing spouses can be motivated to 
privately "work out" custody arrangements in the best interests 
75 Since the primary caretaker's custody is not threatened, this system does 
not have the same pitfalls of the best interests standard, where a parent could use 
a custody challenge to obtain financial concessions from the parent unwilling to 
risk losing custody. Here the non-negotiating primary caretaker might suffer a 
financial penalty, hut custodial presumption remains firm. Moreover, the non-pri-
mary parent would have no financial windfall from alleging his or her spouse's 
failure to negotiate. 
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of the children they love. 
C. Secondary Benefits of a Determinative Primary 
Caretaker Standard 
89 
Finally, the primary caretaker standard may have larger 
social benefits as well. While the rule currently supports wom-
en, this need not be the case. Indeed, the prevalence of women 
as primary caretakers suggests that women still may be dis-
couraged from pursuing their own professional goals. The fail-
ure of more men to qualify as primary caretakers also is trou-
bling. For economic and social reasons, men, who otherwise 
would enjoy nurturing, may be prohibited from spending more 
time with their children. To the extent a primary caretaker 
rule acknowledges and rewards the parent who performs the 
lion's share of maintenance and nurturing activity, it may en-
courage more equal sharing. 76 If mother no longer is automat-
ically seen as the primary caretaker, this may also have a sub-
tle impact on professional socialization. 77 As more fathers take 
on family maintenance responsibility, the work place may bet-
ter accommodate family needs and view fathers as parents too. 
76 See, e.g., Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 707 (Minn. 1985) (defining 
clearly the primary caretaker standard might encourage more active participation 
by fathers in child rearing). 
77 "We cannot stand by and let the family as child rearer be depleted, di-
minished or undermined by decisionmakers who do not take into account such 
costs when fashioning work and career paths." Sonja Goldstein & Joseph Goldstein, 
Families that Work: What's Good For Children is Good for the Country 16 (June 
10-12, 199:3) (presented at the International Society of Family Law Conference, 
copy on file with the B.Y.U. Journal of Public Law). 
